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Abstract
Functional MRI (fMRI) of fully awake and unrestrained
dog ’volunteers’ has been proven an effective tool to
understand the neural circuitry and functioning of the
canine brain. Although every dog owner would vouch
that dogs are perceptive, cognitive, intuitive and capable
of positive emotions/empathy, as indeed substantiated
by ethological studies for some time, neurological
investigations now corroborate this. These studies show
that there exists a striking similarity between dogs
and humans in the functioning of the caudate nucleus
(associated with pleasure and emotion), and dogs
experience positive emotions, empathic-like responses
and demonstrate human bonding which, some scientists
claim, may be at least comparable with human children.
There exists an area analogous to the ’voice area’ in the
canine brain, enabling dogs to comprehend and respond
to emotional cues/valence in human voices, and evidence
of a region in the temporal cortex of dogs involved in
the processing of faces, as also observed in humans
and monkeys. We therefore contend that using dogs in
invasive and/or harmful research, and toxicity testing,
cannot be ethically justifiable.
Introduction
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More than 200 000 dogs are used worldwide in
‘harmful’ research and toxicity testing (experiments likely to cause pain, suffering and distress,
not conducted for veterinary purposes, and often
terminal) every year, with much of these used as the
non-rodent species in the evaluation of the safety of
new drugs and chemicals. This continues in spite of
opposition by the majority of the public, and also
formidable scientific and ethical arguments against
it. For example, recent analyses have shown that
the testing of new human drugs in dogs has little
or no scientific basis or justification, because canine
data are not significantly predictive of the efficacy
and safety of new drugs in humans.1 This is due, in
part, to major differences in the cytochrome P450
‘CYP’ enzymes that metabolise drugs.2 These differences, in level, activity and amino acid sequence,
occur even between breeds and strains of the same
species, meaning extrapolation of data between
species, such as between dogs and humans, is unreliable (see ref 3). Ethical concerns are based on the
stressful nature of the laboratory environment,
and experimental manipulations and procedures
that often may also be painful and terminal (see,
eg, ref 4). Dogs are known to react to unfamiliar
objects, sounds, people, situations and manipulations, as well as restraint and association with
prior unpleasant experiences, with reactions known
to reliably indicate conflict and stress, as well as
anxious postures (see ref 5). Barren, restricted

environments (common features of most laboratory
kennels), kennel noise and restricted sight lines are
acknowledged stressors, and together these factors
lead to well-characterised stereotypies—repetitive, invariant behaviour patterns with no obvious
goal or function, which include circling, pacing,
whirling, jumping, wall bouncing, and repetitive
grooming or self-biting—as well as other abnormal
behaviours such as polydipsia or polyphagia (eating
and drinking to a great degree), compulsive staring
and excessive barking, for example (see ref 5).
Such welfare concerns constitute a large part of
the ethical objection to dog experimentation. A
variety of ethical approaches exist (recently and
elegantly summarised in a report by the Oxford
Centre for Animal Ethics,6 and, eg, the works of
Peter Singer,7 Tom Regan8 and others). One is
instrumentalism, in which dogs are viewed as scientific instruments, a means to an end to be used in
experiments for the benefit of humans, or even to
increase knowledge, usually providing there is no
unnecessary cruelty. Although it may be argued that
no dog experiments are absolutely instrumentalist,
as the welfare of the dogs is considered alongside
human benefits (see below), it may be argued that
some dog experiments are—or almost are—practically instrumentalist because they are approved
and conducted even in the face of low likelihood
of success, and/or low benefit and/or high severity
(based on animal welfare scientist Patrick Bateson’s
3D Cube9). Another is an approach based on dogs’
rights to life and to not be harmed, precluding their
use in scientific experiments at all, or at the very
least in invasive research that is likely to infringe
these rights and to cause them pain and suffering.
This approach is based on societal morals, increasingly underpinned by scientific knowledge, that, it
is argued, afford rights to and acknowledge attributes in non-humans such as dogs, which include
intrinsic worth as individuals, with lives deserving
of respect, and therefore a right not to be harmed
(unless it is for their own good, such as in remedial
surgery). Such attributes include the capacity for
various emotions, feelings and cognitive abilities,
including pain, shock, fear, foreboding, trauma,
anxiety, stress, distress, anticipation and terror,
as well as positive attributes such as pleasure, joy,
anticipation, rewards and so on. These elevate the
ethical status of dogs and challenge moral anthropocentrism (that humans should always have
absolute priority in our moral thinking), instrumentalism (that animals exist for human beings,
to serve their interests) and dualism (that humans
should be distinguished and separated from other
animals).6 There are also utilitarian or ‘greater
good’ approaches of variable ‘stringency’, in which

Bailey J, Pereira S. J Med Ethics 2018;44:47–52. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103630

47

Current controversy
the harms caused to the dogs in experiments are weighed against
the benefits they provide to humans (involving a ‘harm:benefit
analysis’ (HBA)). While a rights-based approach, rather than a
utilitarian perspective, is the standpoint taken by the authors,
the latter is the dominant form of reasoning within science,10
and therefore is the rationale we use to argue against dog experimentation in this review.
In assessing harms to dogs from experimentation—central to the
HBA—it is clearly of paramount importance to attempt to correctly
establish and appreciate the genuine level of suffering the dogs
experience. This is heavily dependent on an accurate comprehension of their sentience—something we argue is not done currently,
and which therefore, along with general exaggeration of human
benefits, leads to the HBA being greatly skewed and biased (see
Discussion and Conclusion). Efforts to better understand canine
sentience, however, continue and are more powerful than ever.
Alongside this growing concern about the use of dogs in harmful
experiments, there have been increasing efforts to understand the
canine mind. For many years, this has been elucidated via ethological
research, which, while elegant and greatly informative, may suffer
from inherent vagaries and inconclusive inferences, and can only
go so far.11 Such limits and caveats, however, are inherent in any
approach, and these should not negate or detract from the weight of
evidence. Simply applying Occam’s razor, it is abundantly obvious
that animals behave as though they feel pleasure. For instance, they
play—something not restricted to primates and, for example, dogs,
but which extends to many species, including many birds, reptiles,
fishes and cephalopods (see refs 12 13). They also appear to take
great pleasure in food and sex, act as though they enjoy touch and
physical sensations such as sunbathing, seem to experience various
emotions and many more (see refs 13–15). In spite of these, there
has always existed a poor attitude in part of the scientific community, and at large—rightly criticised by many—that insists on ever
more ‘proof ’ of these qualities in non-humans, or denying non-humans these experiences and abilities while simply accepting them in
humans (human sentience is no more ‘provable’, scientifically); a
quasi-embargo of properly addressing these concepts or at least on
avoiding their discussion in any great detail.13 All these things are
scientifically and ethically inconsistent, and therefore they result in
poorer and less ethical science.12 13
It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to prove sentience
in other beings; that is accepted. However, we readily accept
the existence of sentience in other humans based on weight of
evidence, and consistency—and science—demand we ought to
do likewise with non-humans.13 Further, the quest to understand canine cognition and sentience has taken great strides in
recent years, with non-invasive functional MRI (fMRI) scanning
of fully awake, unrestrained, trained volunteer dogs, which
was first reported in 2012 by Gregory Berns’ group (Emory
University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA).16 Unlike many experiments
involving dogs, these imaging investigations may be regarded as
not ethically troublesome, in that they involve neither dedicated
breeding and housing of dogs specifically for experimentation,
nor techniques that are invasive and/or harmful to those dogs,
and they would not, therefore, be considered as ‘animal experiments’ in most countries’ legislation. Those who may have moral
objections to harmful dog experiments generally, including the
authors, therefore have no objections to this type of research
in principle. Indeed, it is helping the ethical case against using
dogs in invasive/harmful research, as it has helped to ‘fill the gap’
left by traditional methods of study, allowing investigation of
how dogs’ brains function with regard to what they perceive, the
similarity of their emotional responses to those of humans, their
cognitive abilities and their social intelligence.17 Together with a
48

surge in canine cognition research generally, both neuroscientific
and behavioural, there is now substantial evidence to support the
contention that dogs are able to perceive, feel and understand
much more deeply than previously thought. Examples include
the activity of the brain’s caudate nucleus, which is associated
with pleasure and emotion; the comprehension of language and
emotion in human voices; and the processing of faces and facial
expressions (see ref 17).
In this brief review, we discuss recent evidence in this field,
including claims by some researchers that canine cognition and
sentience are much more advanced than previously accepted. We
argue that scientific evidence demands we reassess and redefine
the way we treat dogs, and give dogs the protection they consequently deserve from any act or procedure that would cause
pain, distress or harm.

Recent research on canine cognition
The caudate nucleus shows important similarities in humans and
dogs

The caudate nucleus is a structure deep in the brain (part of the
basal ganglia), which, among other things, is associated with
positive emotions and expectations, enjoyment, social rewards,
learning and memory (see ref 17). For the first time, in 2012,
Berns et al reported on fMRI studies of fully awake and unrestrained dogs showing similarities in caudate activity in dogs and
humans. Dogs presented with human hand signals that were
associated with a food reward showed a response in the caudate
nucleus that was not present with hand signals associated with
no food reward, in a manner similar to experiments on both
humans and non-human primates.16 A subsequent investigation
validated these findings in a greater number of dogs, showing
that this caudate response was similar to a comparable human
study, and that caudate activation was actually more consistent
in dogs than in humans.18 To further understand the significance
of human interaction in the lives of dogs, the same researchers
(Berns et al) investigated canine brain responses to familiar
and unfamiliar human and dog odours.17 On average, only the
‘familiar human scent’ activated the caudate nucleus in dogs,
suggesting that reward response is reserved for familiar humans
rather than conspecifics, and that not only did dogs discriminate
that scent from the others, but that they had a positive association with it. They concluded that, beyond illustrating the power
of the dogs’ sense of smell, this underlines the importance of
human bonding and attachment in the lives of dogs.

Dogs are highly sensitive to verbal/visual communication and to
human emotions

Dogs are exquisitely sensitive to verbal communication. Experiments have shown that they understand elements of speech, and,
similarly to humans, use different parts of the brain to process
its verbal components and its emotion and intonation. In other
words, they pay attention to what we say and also to how we say
it.19 Recent fMRI experiments have suggested a dedicated ‘voice
area’ in the canine brain, similar to those located in the human
and macaque brain.20 21 This first evidence of a ‘voice area’ in a
non-primate was suggested by way of fMRI scanning of awake,
unrestrained dogs, in which it was noted that human and dog
brains show great similarities in the processing of emotionally
loaded sounds (not sentences or words) in an area near the
primary auditory cortex, allowing the perception of a speaker’s
identity and emotional state, for example.22
As well as being sensitive to verbal communication, dogs are
also extremely sensitive to cues that signal communicative intent,
in a manner previously attributed only to human infants.23 For
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example, they seem able to take into account humans’ visual
attention (ie, where they are looking) when making decisions
and deliberating actions. Studies have shown that dogs have
empathic responses to humans in distress, not limited to those
whom they know/with whom they have a connection; they
may be able to morally evaluate—in essence, to try to determine the difference between what is right and what is wrong
in a personal situation by using logic—are in tune with human
emotions, and to some degree may be able to understand how
we are feeling and want to ‘help’ with behaviours that are ‘…
consistent with empathic concern and comfort-offering’, though
which could be interpreted as emotional contagion.24 25 For
example, moral behaviours such as altruism, tolerance, forgiveness, reciprocity and fairness are evident in the play of canids:
they have rules to ensure that play is not misinterpreted as
spoiling for a fight, which include clear communication (like
the ‘play bow’), assessing partners’ abilities to help establish
an even footing (involving self-handicapping and submission),
apologetic behaviour including understanding and forgiveness if
things go too far, and sincerity and fairness (see ref 26). In experiments similar to those performed in human investigations, dogs
oriented towards humans—whether familiar or strange—when
they were crying, rather than talking or humming, consistent
with behaviour regarded as expressing empathic concern. They
also appear to discriminate human emotions from human facial
expressions, not limited to the mouth.27 Indeed, there is evidence
that—in common with primates for whom facial recognition
and processing is very important—dogs also process facial information,28 discriminating faces based on species and novelty.29
Further, fMRI experiments suggest that this is effected by dedicated neural ‘face processing’ circuitry in visual cortical areas,
rather than due to purely associative mechanisms (eg, associating
a face with a meaningful outcome, such as food) in reward areas
of the brain30; and, crucially, recent (2016) experiments have
shown that dogs are able to integrate emotional information
from visual (facial) and auditory (vocal) cues and inputs—the first
time that integration of heterospecific emotional expressions in
a species other than humans, as well as cross-modal integration
of conspecific emotional expressions beyond primates, has been
demonstrated.31 The ethical significance of all of this lies in the
importance to dogs of recognising others (canine and human)
and their mental/emotional states and intentions, in facilitating
social interactions and functional relationships (both short and
long term), in communication, and in the ability to anticipate the
behaviour of others and adapt and respond to situations quickly
and appropriately in order to increase chances of survival.27–29 31
In summary, recent research may suggest that dogs are highly
sensitive to cues that signal intent; can show empathic concern;
have ‘voice areas’ in their brains similar to those of primates,
enabling them to perceive emotions associated with vocal
communications; can process and recognise faces, as well as
perceive emotion from facial expressions; and can understand
complexities of verbal content.

Discussion and conclusion

The ability to train volunteer dogs (who have the opportunity
to opt out) to lie still while undergoing fMRI scans has recently
opened up new avenues of research into canine cognition and
greatly augmented what we can learn from ethological studies
in this field. As reviewed here, fMRI studies of the canine brain
have revealed positive and consistent responses in the caudate
nucleus, specifically the nucleus accumbens, to objects and
stimuli, including human individuals, that dogs liked. Positive
Bailey J, Pereira S. J Med Ethics 2018;44:47–52. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103630

emotions are invariably linked to caudate activations; specific
parts of the caudate stand out for their consistent activation
to many things that humans enjoy, and indeed caudate activation is so consistent that, under the right circumstances, it can
predict our preferences for food, music and even beauty.17
Canine responses were of a manner and magnitude similar to
caudate responses in humans—a functional homology that may
be indicative of dogs experiencing similar emotions to humans.18
Further fMRI investigations, combined with behavioural studies,
have demonstrated the sensitivity of dogs to human social
interaction/bonding, and that dogs may prefer the company of
familiar humans over the company of either familiar or unfamiliar dogs,32 33 and that dogs may have evolved mechanisms
especially tuned to social cues and therefore may have specialised neural machinery for face processing.33–35 Dogs seem able to
understand a significant amount of human language, including
both verbal and emotional content.
In other words, there is formidable and mounting evidence
illustrating and underlining the complex cognitive and emotional
capacities of dogs. It is important to note that such evidence has,
however, existed for some time from ethological studies, and
indeed many would argue it has simply been obvious from the
most cursory of observations to those who have interacted with
dogs that they (and, in fact, many other non-human species) are
intelligent, emotional and highly sentient beings. Such ethological investigations have demonstrated, and increasingly illustrate, the depth and breadth of their cognitive and emotional
capacities. A recent review (2016) cites observational ethology
and problem-solving experiments in the early 1970s and 1980s
as being part of a ‘rediscovery’ of canine cognition investigations and comparative studies.36 It cites numerous supporting
studies that have increased our understanding of cognition in
dogs, for example via tracking of eye movements (elucidating
interest, preference, planning, intent, emotional perception and
processing), touch-sensitive screens (recognition, categorisation,
communication) and others, as well as non-invasive studies of
canine neurobiology including electroencephalography (EEG)
and fMRI. fMRI data have not, therefore, ‘reinvented the
wheel’, but they have, importantly, expanded the methods by
which scientists can access the minds of other animals, and this is
an important move. Arguably, it should not really be necessary to
prove to any greater degree what seems clear, when considering
the suffering experienced by dogs undergoing invasive experiments, although the fact that this may be an inconvenient truth
to a scientific establishment that uses many tens of thousands
of dogs every year as research subjects may be a factor. Nevertheless, it seems—belatedly perhaps—that the deep, advanced,
and in some ways ‘human-like’ nature of canine cognition and
emotions are finally being recognised by the scientific community, given the degree and type of research being funded and
conducted. fMRI data are cementing this, by showing us the
mechanisms behind these qualities, which parts of the canine
brain are working to achieve them and how. It means that dogs
must, and do, suffer much more than is accepted currently
within part of the scientific community, as evidenced by the type
of dog research being conducted, the number of dogs used and
the suffering associated with some procedures (see Introduction). This has profound and serious consequences for the use of
dogs in harmful experiments and toxicity testing.
One omnipresent caveat of any discussion of fMRI data,
despite more than quarter of a century of human fMRI studies
and use, is their reliability, and the question of what fMRI images
specifically represent in terms of neural activity (see ref 37 for a
discussion). While the exact basis and mechanistic nature of fMRI
49
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images are somewhat controversial and remain under scrutiny
even now, it is generally accepted, based on much evidence, that
the fMRI signal—based as it is on blood flow and oxygen levels
(‘blood oxygen-level dependent [BOLD] signals’)—accurately
represents neural activity. Another potential criticism is that the
fMRI images central to the argument we present in this paper are
simply evidencing neural activity associated with various stimuli
and behaviours, as opposed to being correlates of conscious
experiences. This type of argument is not novel, of course—
even for humans—and it is accepted that the evidence herein
and its like cannot prove conscious experiences. Nonetheless,
there is increasing and convincing evidence from human studies
(of course, humans can follow detailed and complex orders, and
report verbally to researchers) that neuroimaging data strongly
correlate to various mental states. An in-depth review published
in 2015 describes how neuroimaging technologies such as fMRI
and EEG can reveal detailed aspects of, for example, decisions,
intentions, thoughts, imagining tasks, behavioural will and
others in humans.38 For example, in humans, fMRI signatures
(‘brain activation patterns’) correctly identified intentions to
perform specific tasks in 80% of instances,39 revealed movement
intentions before their initiation40 and identified the type and
duration of task being imagined with a mean accuracy of 95%.41
Further support for the assertion of conscious experience versus
stimuli/behaviour-associated neural activity has been provided
by human research showing that imagining performing tasks
generates highly similar patterns of brain activity to actually
performing them, exemplified by imagining limb movement,42
spatial navigation43 and playing tennis.44 In other words, fMRI
patterns can be used as neural proxies for behaviour. Further, the
evidence above is augmented and fortified by many studies that
have been conducted over the past two decades,45 46 comparing,
for instance, imaging patterns in (1) healthy individuals and
in patients assumed to be in a vegetative state or minimally
conscious, and (2) in similar comparative experiments in humans
who are awake and asleep. The former have demonstrated that
many forms of awareness and cognition exist in some people
in vegetative states, in whom specific neuroimaging patterns
are indistinguishable from healthy individuals, and which are
therefore indicative of actual conscious experiences, even to
the degree that people assumed to be in a vegetative state can
communicate, understand and respond to spoken commands
and questions (eg, ref 47 and see ref 38). For example, persons
fulfilling all agreed criteria for being in a vegetative state or minimally conscious show the same fMRI patterns when instructed
to perform mental imaging tasks, such as the tennis playing and
spatial navigation just described.48 The latter, comparing awake
and asleep individuals, have shown that diverse mental states,
including discrete emotional states and experiences, have associated ‘brain states’ in the form of ‘coherent, emotion-specific
patterns’,49–51 supporting the theory that ‘…posit emotions are
represented categorically in the coordinated activity of separable
neural substrates’.52 A recent (2016) review53 cites work demonstrating in humans that valenced brain states can be differentiated on the basis of neural activity (eg, refs 54 55), including
an experiment showing that nine different emotions could be
predicted by fMRI activity, with an accuracy of 84% with the
same subject and 70% with different subjects.56 The same review
reported the authors’ own work, showing that fMRI could
classify six different emotions with 37.3% accuracy, compared
with chance levels of 14.3%.53 57 Meta-analyses corroborate and
strengthen this. Hamann11 summarised a number of these in
his review.11 For example, the five basic emotions of happiness,
sadness, anger, fear and disgust are ‘characterised by consistent
50

neural correlates’ and can be reliably discriminated from each
other,58 and ‘consistent regional brain activations’ correspond to
each basic emotion category.59 More recently, Wager et al60 analysed almost 150 studies involving well over 2000 participants,
and concluded similarly that the five basic emotion categories
are identifiable via patterns of brain activation, revealed by
fMRI, across multiple brain systems such as ‘the cortex, thalamus, amygdala, and other structures’.
The use of dogs in invasive and/or harmful experiments, as
for other non-human species, currently rests on the aforementioned HBA (see Introduction)—that harms to the animals used
must be minimised, and the benefits to others (often humans)
from those experiments must be substantial. It can be argued
that HBA analyses are not currently conducted appropriately.
Inter alia, they are not conducted transparently; are often, if not
always, rudimentary; are performed by individuals who have
heavily invested in animal research; and the failure of animal
experiments to translate to human benefits is not fully considered.10 The harms—as mentioned in the Introduction—we
argue are considerable, yet at the same time underappreciated
and underacknowledged, especially so in light of the fMRI information reviewed herein.4 These issues have been of sufficient
importance to stimulate research into the living conditions and
suffering of dogs in laboratories, as well as changes in these
conditions to improve the welfare of these dogs. Significantly,
however, attempts to ameliorate laboratory conditions for dogs
(and also therefore to improve data from dog experiments) by
providing social housing may still be inadequate: some dogs still
become stressed, anguished, frustrated and bored, and it appears
that at the very least more human social contact may be a sine
qua non.61 Evidence overall, therefore, reveals that harms from
experimentation to the dogs involved may be much greater,
widespread and intractable than previously accepted, skewing
the HBA balance and demanding any benefits be much greater
to redress it. Yet it increasingly appears that this HBA ratio is
skewed even further by the actual value of dog experiments to
humans (see, eg, refs 1–3), which, as exemplified in the Introduction, we believe is much less than is claimed by advocates of dog
research.
In conclusion, in accordance with our intuitions, simple
observation and experience, ethological/behavioural research
and fMRI experiments, dogs are able to morally evaluate; don’t
just ‘hear’ and have a basic understanding of some words, but
also ‘listen’ to human intonation to perceive emotional states
and intent; understand to some degree human ‘communicative
intent’ and perspective, involving to a large extent the eyes;
possess neural machinery for face processing, enabling identification and perception of emotions; and so on. Perhaps most
importantly and crucially, dogs are able to experience positive
emotions, empathic-like responses and demonstrate human
bonding at least comparable with human children, via similar
neural mechanisms: ‘…there is a consensus that the mind of a
dog is very similar in capacity and behaviors to the mind of a
human 2 to 3 year-old’,62 and ‘The ability to experience positive
emotions, like love and attachment, would mean that dogs have
a level of sentience comparable to that of a human child. And
this ability suggests a rethinking of how we treat dogs’.63
It is this degree of (and type of) sentience that is at the crux
of this review, and of its conclusions and demands for change.
We argue that the evidence for the extent of canine sentience
was already out there from ethological studies, but we also show
the evidence collated herein comprising recent, ethical fMRI
brain imaging of ‘volunteer’ dogs augments and fortifies it. Our
inference of these canine fMRI experiments, and the weight of
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evidence regarding what they indicate, is supported by fMRI
experiments involving humans—comparative studies involving
healthy, asleep, minimally conscious and vegetative state individuals—showing that imaging ‘brain activation patterns’ are reliable indicators of conscious thoughts, intentions and emotional
states/feelings. Because all this evidence shows that dog cognition
and sentience are advanced and complex, and that dogs must
experience a variety of emotions, including positive emotions
such as love/attachment, pleasure and empathy, we argue that
this should prompt a more empathic view and response from
us—particularly, perhaps, from ethicists and others involved in
HBAs and approving, licensing and conducting invasive experiments involving dogs. Because HBAs, by their nature, assume
some degree of uncertainty about feelings and emotions in dogs,
our review challenges this assumption and demands a change in
how HBAs are performed. My colleagues and I would argue,
based on what we see as formidable evidence, that HBAs must as
a matter of urgency factor in this evidence, and the associated and
inescapable conclusion that canine feelings and emotions are real
and genuine—and therefore dogs in laboratories and in invasive
and harmful experiments suffer much more than we currently
accept, resulting in greater harm. This is a position supported by
philosophical and ethical deliberations: Peter Singer argues that
sentience gives rise to interests, and these involve pursuing and
experiencing pleasure, as well as avoiding pain and suffering64;
Tom Regan, that lives involving pleasure have intrinsic value65;
the ability to experience pleasure leads to a capacity for quality
of life66; and others. Harm to animals in laboratories, therefore,
results when pain or suffering results directly from experimental
procedures, caging and so on, and from denying those animals
much of their agency, control over their circumstances and the
freedom to pursue their natural behaviours and associated pleasures (eg, exercising, foraging, exploring, choosing social partners and so on13 67 68). Further, there is a strong argument that
animal welfare is compromised if an individual cannot flourish
emotionally, and that happiness and pleasure (and so unhappiness and suffering) depend on emotions and moods, as well as
pleasant and unpleasant experiences.69
We think it is fitting to conclude with neuroscientist Gregory
Berns’ statement following his work: ‘The fMRI data makes it
harder to deny that dogs have feelings very much like we do
and that they deserve a consideration under the law that treats
them as more than a piece of furniture. We have raised the bar
for treating the dogs as sentient individuals with free will. There
are still over 50 000 dogs used in research every year [in the U.S.
alone], so it is an uphill battle. Most of these dogs are either bred
as ‘laboratory-dogs’ – usually beagles – or are acquired from
shelters. I hope that our research will show that dogs have many
of the same emotions that we do, and that it will become harder
to justify using them as research subjects’.70
The authors believe that regulatory authorities worldwide
should recognise the urgency to review and re-evaluate the need,
ethics and legalities of the use of dogs in invasive research and
testing, given our current knowledge and increasing scientific
evidence of dog sentience and cognition.
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